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Abstract 
As an application of his Material Theory of Induction, Norton (2018; manuscript) argues that 
the correct inductive logic for a fair infinite lottery, and also for evaluating eternal inflation 
multiverse models, is radically different from standard probability theory.  This is due to a 
requirement of label independence.  It follows, Norton argues, that finite additivity fails, and 
any two sets of outcomes with the same cardinality and co-cardinality have the same chance.  
This makes the logic useless for evaluating multiverse models based on self-locating chances, 
so Norton claims that we should despair of such attempts.  However, his negative results 
depend on a certain reification of chance, consisting in the treatment of inductive support as 
the value of a function, a value not itself affected by relabeling.  Here we define a purely 
comparative infinite lottery logic, where there are no primitive chances but only a relation of 
‘at most as likely’ and its derivatives.  This logic satisfies both label independence and a 
comparative version of additivity as well as several other desirable properties, and it draws 
finer distinctions between events than Norton’s.  Consequently, it yields better advice about 
choosing between sets of lottery tickets than Norton’s, but it does not appear to be any more 
helpful for evaluating multiverse models.  Hence, the limitations of Norton’s logic are not 
entirely due to the failure of additivity, nor to the fact that all infinite, co-infinite sets of 
outcomes have the same chance, but to a more fundamental problem:  We have no well-







1. Introduction.  
 Norton’s Material Theory of Induction denies that there is a single, universally 
applicable logic of inductive inference.  Rather, it proposes that the warrant for any inductive 
inference lies entirely in the background facts of the particular application (manuscript).  A 
striking example is the case of a fair infinite lottery (ibid.; 2018).  According to Norton, the 
inductive logic for such a lottery must satisfy a strong fairness condition called label 
independence, which renders the logic extremely weak and quite unlike standard (i.e., 
Kolmogorovian) probability theory. 
 In order to refer to particular lottery outcomes, we must assign them labels.  Norton 
also assigns to each set A of possible outcomes a value Ch(A) that he calls a chance, which is 
to be understood as a degree of inductive support but is not necessarily a number.  The 
condition required for a lottery to be fair, on Norton’s view, is 
 
Label independence:  All true statements pertinent to the chances of different 
outcomes remain true when the labels are arbitrarily permuted (manuscript). 
 
Given label independence, Norton shows that, not only countable additivity, but even 
 
Finite additivity:  If A and B are disjoint, then Ch(A È B) = Ch(A) + Ch(B),1 
 
 
1 This definition of finite additivity does not assume that Ch is real-valued, only that there is a designated 
operation ‘+’ over the range of Ch.  There is no such designated operation for Norton’s chances, but he shows 
that, given label independence, Ch cannot be a real valued, finitely additive probability function, with ordinary 
addition.  (His argument also applies to hyperreals.)  We will show here that, whatever sort of values Ch takes, 
if it is not constant and label independence holds then there is no operation ‘+’ that makes it finitely additive 
(Proposition 1).  
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fails.  He also shows that, given label independence, any infinite set of outcomes with an 
infinite complement has the same chance as any other such set.  So, for example, if we label 
the tickets with positive integers, the proposition that the winning number will be even has 
exactly as much support as the proposition that it will be prime, or that it will be composite.   
Another property that fails in Norton’s logic is 
 
Containment:  If A is a proper subset of B, then the chance of A is strictly less than 
that of B, i.e., A Ì B Þ Ch(A) < Ch(B). 
 
Containment does not generally hold in standard probability theory, but it has been regarded 
by some as desirable or plausible, especially by supporters of hyperreal probabilities (taking 
infinitesimal values, real values, and combinations thereof) and of regularity, the property 
that no possible event has probability zero.  (See Benci et al. 2018 for references and 
discussion.)  But, alas, a chance function that satisfies label independence over an infinite 
sample space cannot satisfy containment, as we will see.  
The infinite lottery may be more than an imaginary game.  Norton argues that his 
infinite lottery logic is also the correct inductive logic for self-location within the infinite 
multiverse of eternal inflation cosmology.  Eternal inflation hypothesizes that our “universe” 
is just one of infinitely many spatially infinite bubbles of stability in a rapidly expanding 
background space.  According to the Principle of Mediocrity (Vilenkin 1995), we ought to 
think of ourselves as living in a randomly chosen civilization among the infinitely many 
civilizations scattered across these worlds.  Hence, if a particular model of inflation makes 
worlds like ours quite typical, then the fact that we do live in such a world incrementally 
confirms the model, and if it makes worlds like ours atypical, that incrementally disconfirms 
the model.  Norton reasons that if our civilization, or our world, is chosen arbitrarily, then the 
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chance of finding ourselves in this or that kind of world must be invariant under a relabeling 
of worlds.  Hence the degree to which the properties of our local world confirm or disconfirm 
a given model must be calculated by the same strange, weak logic that applies to fair infinite 
lotteries. 
But if this is correct, there is little calculation to do.  For any non-trivial property of 
worlds, in any plausible model of eternal inflation there are infinitely many worlds with that 
property and infinitely many without it.  Hence, on Norton’s logic, we are no more likely to 
find ourselves in one kind of world than another, so the fact that we observe a world like ours 
does nothing to confirm or disconfirm the model.  Nonetheless, Norton argues, this is the 
correct logic for the domain, as warranted by the background facts.  Hence, he concludes, we 
must despair of confirming or disconfirming eternal inflation models in this way.   
I will give a brief exposition of Norton’s infinite lottery logic, mention some 
concerns, and strengthen his proof that additivity fails.  However, the main purpose of this 
note is to show that Norton’s negative results depend not only on label independence but also 
on some tacit assumptions.  Norton seems to assume that chances are, in a certain sense, 
things:  They are values of a function “Ch”.  Because of this, we can say things like ‘The 
chance that the outcome is in set S is X’, and therefore label independence seems to force us 
to assign the same chance X to any set that is related to S by a relabeling.  Consequently, any 
two sets with the same cardinality and co-cardinality (the cardinality of the complement in 
the set of all possible outcomes) have the same chance, and finite additivity fails.   
Another tacit assumption involved in this reasoning is the assumption that chances are 
not things that are themselves modified by a relabeling of outcomes.  We might, for example, 
identify the chance of an outcome set with the equivalence class of all equally supported sets.  
In that case, if a relabeling (permutation) maps a set A to B, then it also maps Ch(A) = [A] = 
{X: A and X are equally supported} to Ch(B) = [B] = {X: B and X are equally supported}.  
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That is, under the relabeling, ‘Ch(A) = [A]’ becomes ‘Ch(B) = [B]’, which holds even if [A] 
is not equal to [B].  So Ch(A) = [A] does not imply that Ch(B) = [A], nor, therefore, that 
Ch(A) = Ch(B).  Thus, Norton’s argument also depends on the tacit assumption that the 
chances are something absolute and independent of the outcome sets, i.e., something 
unaffected by a relabeling of the outcomes, not just in the sense of label independence, but in 
the sense that the chances’ own descriptions are not modified by the relabeling.  I will refer to 
chances as absolute if they are not affected by a relabeling in this sense. 
In a comparative treatment of chance, where there is no absolute chance function but 
only a relation of “is at most as likely as”2 (≼), Norton’s negative results fail.  In fact, we will 
define such a relation that satisfies transitivity, reflexiveness, 
 




Complementarity:  If A ≼ B, then BC ≼ AC, 
 
(where AC is the complement of A), as well as comparative versions of label independence, 
finite additivity, regularity, and containment.   
However, there are some limitations upon relations that have these properties.  It turns 
out that a reasonable inductive support relation on infinite lottery outcomes cannot satisfy the 
standard comparative analog of countable additivity, namely, 
 
 
2 I have chosen this expression carefully.  I did not choose the expression ‘is no more likely than’, as that might 
be taken as a synonym of ‘is not more likely than’, which could be regarded as true even if the chances are not 
comparable.  Our symbol ‘≼’ instead expresses a relation in which the events are comparable, and the first is 
either exactly as likely as the second or less likely. 
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Monotone continuity:  If A1 Í A2 Í A3 Í… and A1, A2, A3,… ≼ B then ⋃i Ai ≼ B. 
 
Nor can such a relation be total; it cannot satisfy  
 
Comparability: For all A, B, either A ≼ B or B ≼ A, 
 
unless it is completely trivial.  If comparability, transitivity, and comparative versions of 
additivity and label independence hold, then any two sets of outcomes are equally likely, so 
the resulting logic is utterly useless.  It draws no distinctions whatsoever, not even between 
the impossible event Æ and the certain event Ω (the set of all possible outcomes).  
 Nonetheless, if we do not require total comparability, we can have a non-trivial 
relation with the promised properties, and, unlike in Norton’s logic, different infinite, co-
infinite sets (sets with infinite complements in the sample space) can differ in likelihood.  
Given containment, for example, the set of outcomes labelled with multiples of four is strictly 
more supported than the set of even outcomes.  This seems quite reasonable, given that 
whenever the latter set wins, the former does too, but not vice versa.  Thus our comparative 
logic draws finer distinctions between sets of lottery outcomes than Norton’s.  If one is 
offered an opportunity to buy either all of the even-numbered tickets or all of the multiples of 
four for the same price, or the odd-numbered tickets versus the prime-numbered tickets, our 
logic indicates a clear and sensible preference. 
 Another reason for considering a comparative infinite lottery logic comes from 
Norton’s own Material Theory of Induction.  If the warrant for any inductive inference lies 
entirely in the background facts of the particular application, what background facts about a 
fair infinite lottery warrant the assumption that the correct logic involves a chance function?  
Certain comparative relationships can be justified.  For example, whenever the winning ticket 
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is labeled with a multiple of four, it is also labeled with an even number.  Hence, drawing an 
even numbered ticket can be no more likely than drawing a multiple of four.  If there is a 
chance function into some ordered structure of absolute chances that reflects such 
relationships, this must be shown by means of a representation theorem, or otherwise justified 
from considerations of what constitutes a fair infinite lottery.  In this sense, comparative 
chance relations are more fundamental than Norton’s chance function.  They can, at least 
sometimes, be motivated directly, while the assumption that an absolute chance function 
exists requires further justification. 
Despite its advantages, though, it does not appear that our comparative infinite lottery 
logic will help us in the evaluation of infinite multiverse models.  It tells us, for example, that 
within a given model of eternal inflation, a set A of worlds is more likely to contain our 
world than any proper subset of A is.  But when A is infinite and co-infinite, it does not tell 
us whether A is more likely than AC, and hence it is not clear whether finding our world to be 
an A-world confirms or disconfirms the model.  Furthermore, without a justifiable way of 
identifying worlds across models, we cannot conclude that an infinite, co-infinite set A of 
worlds in one model is less likely than another such set B in another model.  Hence, it is not 
clear that the properties of our world can confirm one model over another.  A relevant 
identification of worlds across models seems unlikely, so our comparative logic does not 
appear to be much more useful for confirmation than Norton’s. 
In any case, our comparative logic shows that Norton’s infinite lottery logic is not the 
only one possible.  There is at least one other inductive logic meeting Norton’s explicit 
constraint (label independence) that nonetheless draws finer distinctions between outcome 
sets, provided we do not insist that all events are comparable, or that there are independent 




2. Norton’s infinite lottery logic. 
According to Norton, the “essential content” of his infinite lottery logic is given by 
assigning a chance value to each set of lottery outcomes, so as to define a chance function 
“Ch” (2018, section 8).  On his view, a fair infinite lottery machine chooses among a 
countable infinity of outcomes “without favor”, and what it is to choose without favor is 
specified by the requirement of label independence given above (manuscript).  Previous 
treatments of “fair” infinite lotteries, from de Finetti (1964) to Benci et al. (2013, 2018), have 
not assumed label independence and have not arrived at Norton’s logic.  Instead they have 
supposed that fairness consists in the weaker requirement that each individual outcome has 
the same chance, i.e., for all x, y Î Ω, Ch({x}) = Ch({y}).  If we assume that Ch is real-
valued, it follows immediately from the Kolmogorov axioms of finite additivity and unit 
measure (i.e., Ch(Ω) = 1) that Ch({x}) = 0 for each x.  However, this contradicts the axiom of 
countable additivity, since 0 + 0 + 0 + … = 0, while the chance of the union ⋃ {𝑥}!	∈	$  is 
Ch(Ω) = 1.  Hence de Finetti and others have rejected countable additivity for infinite 
lotteries, and some (e.g., Wenmackers and Horsten 2010; Benci et al. 2013; 2018) have gone 
further to permit hyperreal chances.  The latter move allows one to avoid the conclusion that 
Ch({x}) = 0 and instead assign an infinitely small non-zero chance to each outcome, 
preserving regularity and containment and permitting a modified analog of countable 
additivity (Benci et al. 2013; 2018). 
Norton (manuscript) argues that all such attempts to apply probability-like theories to 
fair infinite lotteries amount to changing the problem.  This is because they all violate label 
independence, and “label independence is a defining characteristic of an infinite lottery 
machine” (manuscript).  Historically, it seems more accurate to say that Norton has changed 
the problem, for only he has identified label independence as a requirement of fairness.  
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Previous approaches to infinite lotteries have only required the weaker fairness condition on 
individual outcomes.  Nonetheless, label independence holds in a fair finite lottery, and it 
seems sensible to extend it to the infinite case.  In a finite or infinite lottery, one could 
plausibly buy or bet on arbitrarily many tickets in one fell swoop.  Fairness then seems to 
require that the chance of winning such a bet does not depend on the arbitrary way in which 
the tickets have been numbered, and hence label independence seems to be a reasonable 
fairness requirement.  In any case, the problem of finding the correct logic satisfying label 
independence seems worth considering. 
As noted, this problem might be more than an interesting game.  Norton argues that 
his infinite lottery logic is the correct logic for confirming or disconfirming eternal inflation 
models based on local evidence.  This, however, might be doubted.  Norton himself briefly 
considers the analogy of an array of coin flips, in which the dynamics of the coin tosses, 
rather than the choosing without favor of a particular coin, determine the chance of observing 
heads or tails.  Similarly we might expect that it is the dynamics of eternal inflation and the 
processes by which pocket worlds emerge that determine the chance that an arbitrary world 
will be like ours, rather than the Principle of Mediocrity and label independence.  Norton 
(2018) likens the coin model to “worldline based” measures discussed in the cosmology 
literature and sets it aside, pointing out that, according to cosmologists, such measures 
“exhibit an objectionable sensitivity to initial conditions” (ibid.).  I think that the coin model, 
and the idea that the relevant chances are driven by physical dynamics rather than label 
independence, warrants further investigation.  But the Principle of Mediocrity is taken 
seriously, and the debate around it is troubled by the implication that any additive measure 
over worlds depends on how the worlds are labeled or counted.  The problem of finding a 
label-independent distribution over a countable infinity of worlds is entirely analogous to that 
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of Norton’s fair infinite lottery and is addressed by the same label-independent logic, even if 
that is not, in the end, the correct inductive logic for self-location in a multiverse.  
In any case, Norton deduces from label-independence that any two sets of worlds, or 
lottery outcomes, with the same cardinality and co-cardinality must have the same chance.  
This is because, if two sets A and B have the same cardinality and co-cardinality, then there 
is a relabeling of Ω that swaps all of the labels from A to B.  As discussed, the inference from 
this to the conclusion that A and B have the same chance depends on the assumption that 
each set A of worlds or outcomes has a chance Ch(A) whose identity is not itself affected by 
a relabeling.  But assuming this, Norton’s deduction is correct.  In particular, any two subsets 
of Ω with the same finite cardinality n must have the same chance, and Norton calls this 
chance Vn.  Likewise, any two sets with finite co-cardinality n must have the same chance, 
which he calls V–n.  In a countably infinite sample space, there remain only the countably 
infinite, countably co-infinite sets, which must all have the same chance V¥.  If we further 
assume, as Norton suggests, that that the chance of a set of outcomes is at least as great as 
that of any subset, we obtain a qualitative ranking of chances: 
 
V0 ≤ V1 ≤ V2 ≤ V3 ≤ … ≤ V∞ ≤ … ≤ V–3 ≤ V–2 ≤ V–1 ≤ V–0. 
 
It may seem natural to take these inclusive inequalities to be strict (<), but on Norton’s 
Material Theory of Induction, we must not assume that they are strict unless it is warranted 
by the facts of the case. 
Interpreting these values, Norton (manuscript) offers a rule of coordination according 
to which, for finite n > 0, events of chance Vn are not to be expected, since they consist of 
only finitely many possible outcomes, “swamped” by the infinity of other outcomes.  
Similarly, events of chance V–n are to be expected, while events of chance V∞ are simply “as 
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likely as not”.  Chance V–0 in particular indicates an event that is certain to happen, and V0 
one that is certain not to.  Though Norton does not say so, this interpretation requires that the 
innermost inequalities above are strict, so that Vn < V∞ < V–n for n > 0.  To such extent that 
the facts warrant Norton’s interpretive scheme, they also warrant these strict inequalities, but 
we will not press that point here. 
It is not difficult to see that label independence contradicts finite additivity, given 
some familiar assumptions.  However, Norton’s proof can be strengthened.  What Norton 
shows is that a finitely additive probability function on an infinite sample space cannot be 
label-independent.  He considers a sample space Ω = {1, 2, 3,…} and introduces four subsets,  
 
one = {1, 5, 9,…}, 
two = {2, 6, 10,…}, 
three = {3, 7, 11,…}, 
four = {4, 8, 12,…}. 
 
He argues that Ch(one) = Ch(two) = Ch(three) = Ch(four), due to label independence.  By the 
same token, the infinite and co-infinite set two È three È four must also have the same 
chance, i.e., Ch(two È three È four) = Ch(one) = Ch(two) =….  And unless all of these 
chances are zero, Norton says, this violates finite additivity, since for a finitely additive 
probability measure P,  
 
P(two) + P(three) + P(four) = P(two È three È four).                            (*) 
 
Norton does not explain further why Ch cannot satisfy (*), but presumably it is because 
ordinary addition of real (or hyperreal) numbers is strictly monotonic in the sense that a + b > 
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a if b > 0.  Since Ch(two) = Ch(two È three È four), Ch cannot satisfy (*) unless Ch(three) = 
Ch(four) = 0.  And in that case we also get Ch(one) = Ch(two) = Ch(two È three È four) = 0.  
Hence, (*) , and therefore finite additivity, must be false unless all of these chances are zero.  
And, we may add, the latter possibility is both implausible and unhelpful.  If all of these 
chances are zero, then finite additivity would imply that Ch(Ω) = Ch(one) + Ch(two) + 
Ch(three) + Ch(four) = 0.  This contradicts the unit measure axiom of probability (P(Ω) = 1) 
and further makes the certain event Ω and the impossible event Æ equally likely, which is 
absurd. 
 Thus Norton shows conclusively that Ch is not a finitely additive, real-valued or even 
hyperreal-valued probability.  The reason I say that Norton’s proof can be strengthened is 
because Norton’s chances are not real or hyperreal numbers.  Hence we might suppose that 
they have an addition operation that is not strictly monotonic but satisfies finite additivity.  
After all, Cantor’s cardinal numbers have such an addition operation.  The sum of two 
cardinals c and d is just the maximum of the two if either cardinal is infinite.  And since the 
chance of a set of lottery outcomes is here determined by the cardinalities of the set and its 
complement, it would not be surprising if these chances had an arithmetic similar to cardinal 
arithmetic.  So we might hope to define chance addition in such a way that strict 
monotonicity fails and additivity holds.    
 However, this cannot be done without trivializing chances.  We can show that there is 
no well defined binary operation ‘+’ on Norton’s chances Vi that satisfies finite additivity 
unless all the Vi are identical (for i = 0, 1, 2,…, ∞,…, –2, –1, –0).  For, we can show that if 
both label independence and finite additivity hold, then all infinite sets have the same chance 
(Proposition 1(1) in the Appendix).  This is untenable, given that an infinite, co-infinite set of 
outcomes is as likely as not, while an infinite, co-finite set is to be expected.  Furthermore, if 
we make the minimally rational assumption that the complement of an event that is certain to 
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occur is certain not to occur, then label independence and finite additivity imply that all co-
infinite sets also have the same chance.  Thus, by transitivity of identity, all sets of outcomes 
have the same chance (Proposition 1(2)).  This trivializes chances and, again, is utterly 
implausible, for it implies that the empty set of outcomes, which cannot occur, has the same 
chance as the set of all possible outcomes, which must occur.  Hence, finite additivity fails 
unavoidably for any reasonable chance function on a label-independent, countably infinite 
lottery. 
 It is easy to see that containment also fails for Norton’s chance function.  For 
example, if Ω = {1, 2, 3,…} and A = {4, 8, 16,…}, then A is a proper subset of B = {2, 4, 
6,…}, so containment implies that A must have strictly smaller chance than B.  But A and B 
are both infinite and co-infinite, so label independence implies that they must have the same 
chance. 
 
3. A comparative infinite lottery logic. 
 Let us now see what can be gained if we sacrifice the notion of a chance function and 
absolute chances.  Let Ω be a set of possible lottery outcomes.  For any two sets A, B Ì Ω, let  
 
A ≼ B Û A \ B is finite and |A \ B| < |B \ A|, 
 
where ‘A \ B’ denotes set difference A Ç (BC) and ‘|×|’ denotes Cantorian cardinality.  The 
condition that A \ B is finite is needed here if Ω is infinite, because without that stipulation 
we would have A ≼ B for any disjoint countably infinite sets A and B, entailing violations of 
either additivity and containment or transitivity. 
 Norton’s infinite lottery logic is derived from his analysis of the “background facts” 
of a fair infinite lottery, especially the requirement of label independence.  Our project here is 
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somewhat different; we primarily want to show that there exists at least one alternative 
inductive logic that is not ruled out by those background facts, and that such a logic could 
have many nice properties that Norton’s logic lacks.  Thus our relation ≼ is presented first 
and foremost as an example of a comparative logic that does not violate label independence.  
Its primary philosophical interest lies in showing that, if we do not assume that outcome sets 
have absolute chances, then label independence does not contradict additivity.  Whether the 
background facts of an infinite lottery, or eternal inflation, do warrant our particular 
comparative logic is another question. 
However, some motivation for our particular comparative logic can be given.  The ‘if’ 
direction of our definition of ‘≼’ does seem to be warranted, for, if one difference A \ B or B 
\ A is strictly smaller than the other, then it is plausible that the former difference is at most 
as likely as the latter. Furthermore, since A and B are, tautologically, the same except for 
their differences, the relative likelihoods of those differences should determine the relative 
likelihoods of A and B.3  The condition that one of the differences is finite just guarantees 
that the relative sizes and likelihoods of the differences are clear.  Even on Norton’s system, a 
finite outcome set has smaller chance than an infinite one.  It therefore seems reasonable that 
the set with a finite difference should also have a smaller chance than the set with an infinite 
difference or a larger finite difference. 
  Whether the ‘only if’ direction is warranted is essentially the question of whether 
two sets with infinite differences (which are therefore countably infinite and co-infinite) 
should be regarded as incomparable or equal in support.  We may ask whether the 
assumption of incomparability is warranted, but it would seem that the greater burden lies on 
one who holds that comparability is warranted.  Our relation declines to comment on pairs of 
sets with infinite differences, whereas a total relation that makes them equal would require 
 
3 This intuition is equivalent to the comparative version of additivity, discussed below. 
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some warrant for doing so.  Again, label independence may seem to suggest that sets related 
by a relabeling are equally likely, but if we do not assume that events have absolute chances, 
then label independence is compatible with some such sets being merely incomparable.  And 
again, it is not clear that the assumption of absolute chances is warranted by the facts of a fair 
infinite lottery.  Hence, our chance relation seems to be better warranted than Norton’s 
chance function, as it involves fewer assumptions.  The philosophical motivation for 
requiring that the smaller difference be finite in our definition of ‘≼’ is simply that, in this 
context, if both differences are infinite, they have the same cardinality and co-cardinality, and 
hence we have no clear basis for comparison. 
 Let us now see what properties our partial relation ‘≼’ has.  First, note that it is 
transitive, reflexive, and monotonic (Propositions 2-4 in the Appendix).   
Now let us formulate a precise version of label independence for relations.  A labeling 
of Ω is a bijection l: N ® Ω.  Given X Ì N, let us write lX for the set {l(x): x Î X} Ì Ω.  We 
can now define  
 
 Label independence':  For any X, Y Ì N and labelings l1, l2,  
l1X ≼ l1Y Û l2X ≼ l2Y. 
 
This is logically weaker than label independence proper, but it is clearly equivalent to label 
independence in a context where anything we can say about the chances is equivalent to some 
collection of statements that are each of the form X ≼ Y or ¬( X ≼ Y).  And, indeed, our 
relation ‘≼’ is label-independent' (Proposition 5). 
A standard comparative analog of finite additivity going back to de Finetti (1964, 
originally 1937) is 
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Additivity': If A Ç C = B Ç C = Æ, then A ≼ B Û A È C ≼ B È C. 
  
Though this property is commonly called additivity in the literature (e.g., Fishburn 1986), its 
precise relationship to finite additivity for absolute probabilities is not obvious.  Kraft et al. 
(1959) showed that it does not imply the existence of a finitely additive probability measure 
on Ω that “almost agrees” with ‘≼’ in the sense that A ≼ B Þ P(A) < P(B).  However, it does 
imply that we can construct abstract chances with an operation that satisfies finite additivity.  
Let us write ‘A ~ B’ for ‘A ≼ B and B ≼ A’.  Let Ch(A) = [A] = {X Í Ω: X ~ A}, and 
define addition by [A] + [B] = [A È B] where A Ç B = Æ.  Additivity' guarantees that this is 
well defined, for if [C] = [A] and [D] = [B] then [C È D] = [A È B] (Proposition 6).  This 
way of defining Ch, taking equivalence classes of outcome sets as values, does not 
undermine finite additivity, because it does not license us to infer that, given a permutation p 
of Ω, Ch(A) = Ch(pA).  It instead licenses us to infer from Ch(A) = [A] that Ch(pA) = [pA], 
but that is trivial and consistent with additivity. 
 Thus, additivity' does imply that finite additivity is satisfiable.  And, as it happens, our 
‘≼’ is additive' (Proposition 7). 
It is obvious how to formulate the comparative version of containment: 
 
Containment':  A Ì B Þ A ≺ B, 
 
where ‘A ≺ B’ is shorthand for ‘A ≼ B and it is not the case that B ≼ A’.  Norton 
(manuscript) suggests that the chance of a set of outcomes cannot be diminished if we add 
further outcomes to the set, so that the relation ‘is at most as strong as’ on chances inherits 
the properties of set theoretic inclusion.  Prima facie, it seems just as plausible that the chance 
of a set of outcomes is actually increased if we add further outcomes to the set.  In fact, those 
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who hold that chances should satisfy both finite additivity and regularity must accept 
containment' as a consequence.  Since permutations preserve set inclusion, one might expect 
that containment' is compatible with label independence', so it is not too surprising that our 
chance relation does satisfy containment' (Proposition 8). 
In Norton’s logic, all infinite, co-infinite sets have the same chance.  Containment' 
implies that our chance relation draws finer distinctions between sets of outcomes.  For 
example, if we again label the outcomes 1, 2, 3,…, then {4, 8, 12,..} ≺ {2, 4, 6,…}.  As well, 
prime = {n: n is prime} ≺ odd = {n: n is odd}, since prime \ odd = {2} while odd \ prime is 
infinite. 
Though it is controversial, many have argued that chances should be regular, for 
various reasons.  (See Benci et al. 2018 for discussion and references.)  A natural 
comparative analog of regularity is 
 
Regularity':  If B ¹ Æ then Æ ≺ B. 
 
In Norton’s ordering of chances, we have Ch(Æ) < Ch(B), but Norton is studiously silent on 
whether Ch(B) < Ch(Æ) for B ¹ Æ.  If this is never the case, then the ordering of sets induced 
by their chances is regular', and if not, not.  However, our relation ‘≼’ is explicitly regular'. 
(Proposition 9).  In fact, regularity' is just the special case of containment' where A = Æ. 
 Complementarity is an eminently reasonable property for a chance relation to have, 
for an event is likely just insofar as its non-occurrence is unlikely.  So it stands to reason that 
an event A is at most as likely as B if and only BC is at most as likely as AC.  Happily, our 
relation has this property too (Proposition 10). 




4. Limitations of comparative infinite lottery logic. 
 Villegas (1964) identified monotone continuity as the key property required for there 
to be a countably additive probability function agreeing with a given relation.  (Our slightly 
generalized version of monotone continuity above follows Fishburn (1986)).  However, any 
reasonable chance relation for a fair infinite lottery, including our ‘≼’, must lack this 
property.  In particular, we assume that a chance relation in this context should satisfy 
complementarity and  
 
Infinity dominance:  If A is finite and B infinite, then A ≼ B and Æ ≺ B. 
 
Proposition 11 tells us that such a relation on the subsets of a countably infinite outcome 
space cannot be monotonically continuous.4 
By definition, our chance relation ‘≼’	does	not	satisfy	comparability,	but	we	might	
wonder	whether	some	chance	relation	could	satisfy	comparability	without	sacrificing	
the	other	nice	properties	we	have	established.		The answer is no.  Much as finite additivity 
would imply that Norton’s chances are all equal, we can show that if a chance relation 
satisfies transitivity, label independence', additivity', and comparability, it is just the trivial 
relation that holds between any two sets (Proposition 12). 
 
5. Application to multiverse cosmologies. 
There are various models of inflation (e.g., “slow roll” versus “bubble nucleation”), 
and the way in which properties are distributed over worlds is model-dependent (Vilenkin 
 
4 DiBella (2018) shows that, under Koopman’s (1940) axioms of comparative conditional confidence, monotone 
continuity is inconsistent with the weak fairness condition that {x} ~ {y} for each x, y Î Ω. 
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1995).  The problem with applying Norton’s logic to eternal inflation was that, for any model 
according to which there are infinitely many worlds like ours and infinitely many unlike it, 
the chance of finding ourselves in a world like ours is, on his logic, simply “as likely as not”.  
Any infinite, co-infinite set of worlds is as likely as any other to contain the world we 
observe, setting aside selection effects.  So, even if, on some measure, our world is extremely 
typical or atypical in a given model, observing a world like ours does not make the model any 
more or less likely to be correct.  Furthermore, such an observation does not confirm one 
model of inflation any more than it confirms another.  (Of course, there may be other kinds of 
locally available evidence, depending on the details of the theory.  See Vilenkin 2011 for 
some discussion.)   
Our comparative logic does not have quite the same problem.  On our logic, some 
properties of worlds are more likely than others, even though both properties hold in 
infinitely many worlds and fail in infinitely many worlds.  For example, suppose some 
property P holds in a countable infinity of worlds and fails in a countable infinity of worlds, 
while property Q holds in a countably infinite proper subset of those having P.  For Norton, 
we are exactly as likely to observe P as Q (again, setting aside any selection effects).  Under 
our comparative logic, we are more likely to observe P than Q, in virtue of containment'. 
 Unfortunately, this appears to be little help if we want to evaluate the inductive 
support for a given model of eternal inflation.  We can deduce that one observation is more 
confirming than another, but this does not tell us whether to regard either observation as 
incrementally confirming or disconfirming the model.  Nor does our logic seem to help with 
evaluating multiple models relative to each other.  Suppose we observe property P in our 
world.  What we need in order to infer that a model M is better confirmed than a model N is 
to show that M makes P more likely than N does.  But our comparative chance relation does 
not extend across models.  The models M and N will simply contain different worlds, and our 
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relation can say nothing about how an infinite, co-infinite set of worlds in one model 
compares, in terms of inductive support, to one in another model.  Nor can we identify a set 
of worlds in one model with a set of worlds in another.  In general, the models will not even 
contain specific worlds, but only tell us something about how properties are distributed 
among the worlds generated by some stochastic process.   
If two models do contain specific worlds, we might consider identifying the most 
similar counterparts across models, much as Lewis does in his possible worlds semantics for 
modality (1968), but this does not appear to work.  Outside the semantic demands of modal 
locutions, there is no clear reason to identify counterparts across models, nor to attribute to 
such counterpart relations any evidentiary value.  And anyway, such a move would tend to 
identify worlds that have the same properties, so that, from one model to another, there would 
be little difference between the ways properties are distributed over the worlds so identified. 
 On the other hand, it might be the case that a model M makes a property P more likely 
than another property Q, while model N makes them equally likely, or at least makes ‘P and 
not Q’ very unlikely because {P-worlds} \ {Q-worlds} is finite.  Then if we observe P and 
not Q, this would seem to be some evidence for M over N.  But we are extremely unlikely to 
observe P-and-not-Q unless, in the real universe, {P-worlds} \ {Q-worlds} is infinite.  Hence 
the evidence P-and-not-Q would strongly disconfirm both models unless, in model M, {P-
worlds} \ {Q-worlds} is infinite.  But in that case we have observed a property, P-and-not-Q, 
that is instantiated by infinitely many worlds in model M and only finitely many in model N.  
Then indeed, model M is better confirmed, but that is a case that even Norton’s logic can 
handle.  What we want is a logic that can help us when the evidence consists in properties 
that are instantiated in an infinite, co-infinite set of worlds in every model under 
consideration.  And that sort of logic, it appears, we still do not have. 
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 One lesson we can take away from this is that the difficulty of applying label 
independence to self-location in an infinite multiverse runs deeper than the particular formal 
oddities of Norton’s absolute logic, namely the failure of finite additivity and the equality of 
all infinite, co-infinite sets.  Even a comparative inductive support relation satisfying label 
independence, additivity, and containment does not help us to evaluate multiverse theories 
based on self-locating belief, for it provides no basis for comparing infinite sets that have 
infinite differences.  While label independence' on its own does not guarantee that infinite, 
co-infinite sets have equal inductive support, as in Norton’s logic, it does block us from 
judging one such set to be strictly better supported than another when the sets are disjoint.  
This makes comparisons between a set of worlds and its complement, or between sets of 
worlds within different models, unhelpful for evaluating multiverse theories. 
 
6. Conclusion.   
Norton’s infinite lottery logic is radically different from and weaker than standard 
inductive logic or probability theory.  The chief difference that Norton emphasizes is the 
failure of finite additivity.  However, in a comparative infinite lottery logic, satisfying a 
comparative analog of Norton’s key principle of label independence, we can have a 
comparative version of additivity, and we can even construct chances (equivalence classes of 
events) that have an additive operation without violating label independence.  We can also 
have transitivity, reflexiveness, monotonocity, and comparative analogs of regularity and 
containment.  These properties enable us to draw finer distinctions of likelihood between sets 
of outcomes for fair, label-independent infinite lotteries.  And yet, we may still lack a useful 
tool for evaluating multiverse theories on the basis of local features of the world.  Without a 
way of identifying worlds across different models, our logic does not seem to provide a 
means of determining which multiverse theories make worlds like ours more likely.  What it 
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does provide is an illustration of the fact that Norton’s infinite lottery logic is not the only one 
possible under his strong fairness condition.  If we sacrifice total comparability and the 
notion of independent entities called chances, we can recover additivity, as well as many 





Appendix:  Proofs. 
Proposition 1:  Given a label-independent and finitely additive function Ch on a countably 
infinite sample space Ω,  
(1) Ch(A) = Ch(B) for all infinite sets A, B Í Ω, and 
(2) if for all A Í Ω, either Ch(A) ¹ Ch(Ω) or Ch(AC) = Ch(Æ), then Ch(B) = 
Ch(C) for any B, C Í Ω. 
Proof:  (1) Suppose A, B Í Ω are infinite.  Partition each into two infinite, co-infinite sets C, 
D Í A and E, F Í B, so that C Ç D = E Ç F = Æ, C È D = A, and E È F = B.  Since C, D, E, 
F are all infinite and co-infinite, they all have the same chance, by label independence.  By 
finite additivity, Ch(A) = Ch(C) + Ch(D) = Ch(E) + Ch(F) = Ch(B). 
(2) Assume that for all A Í Ω, Ch(A) ¹ Ch(Ω) or Ch(AC) = Ch(Æ).  We first show 
that for any co-infinite D, E Í Ω, Ch(D) = Ch(E).  Let D, E Í Ω be co-infinite.  Then by (1), 
Ch(DC) = Ch(EC) = Ch(Ω).  By our assumption, then, Ch(D) = Ch(E) = Ch(Æ).  So all co-
infinite sets have equal chance, and as we already saw, all infinite sets have equal chance.  
But all subsets of Ω are either infinite or co-infinite, and some are both, so by transitivity of 
identity, Ch(B) = Ch(C) for any B, C Í Ω. n     
 
Proposition 2:  ‘≼’ is transitive. 
Proof:  Assume A ≼ B and B ≼ C.  Then by definition of ≼, A \ B and B \ C are finite,  
|A \ B| < |B \ A|, and |B \ C| < |C \ B|, where ‘|.|’ denotes Cantorian cardinality.  We need to 
show that A ≼ C, i.e., A \ C is finite and |A \ C| < |C \ A|.  Let us partition A, B, and C into 
necessarily disjoint subsets.  (For brevity we write ‘XY’ for ‘X È Y’.)  Let  
  a = A \ (BC),   b = B \ (AC),  
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c = C \ (AB),  
d = A Ç B \ C,  
e = B Ç C \ A,  
f = A Ç C \ B.   
(See Figure 1.)  Then a, b, c, d, e, f are all pairwise disjoint. 
Note A \ B = af, B \ A = be, B \ C = bd, C \ B = cf, A \ C = ad, and C \ A = ce.   
A \ C = ad is finite because A \ B = af and B \ C = bd are finite.  It only remains to show that 
|ad| < |ce|. 
Adding our two inequalities, |A \ B| < |B \ A|, and |B \ C| < |C \ B|, we get  
|af| + |bd| < |be| + |cf|. 
Hence |adbf| < |cebf|, so 
                       |ad| + |bf| < |ce| + |bf|.            (**) 
In general, subtraction is not defined for cardinals, but it is for finite cardinals.  We 




















If c or e is infinite, then |ad| < |ce| and the claim holds. 
If c and e are both finite, then subtraction applies.  Subtracting |bf| from the inequality 
(**), |ad| < |ce|.  Therefore, A \ C = ad is finite and |A \ C| < |C \ A|, so A ≼ C. n 
 
Proposition 3:  ‘≼’ is reflexive. 
Proof:  A ≼ A Û (A \ A is finite and |A \ A| < |A \ A|).  Since  A \ A = Æ and 0 < 0, this is 
true. n 
 
Proposition 4:  ‘≼’ is monotonic. 
Proof:  A ≼ A È B Û (A \ (A È B) is finite and |A \ (A È B)| < |(A È B) \ A|).  But  
|A \ (A È B)| = 0 < |(A È B) \ A|, so the claim holds. n 
 
Lemma 1:  A relation ≼ on the subsets of a countably infinite set Ω is label-independent' if 
and only if for any permutation p: Ω ® Ω, and any A, B Ì Ω,  
A ≼ B Û pA ≼ pB. 
Proof:  If ≼ is label-independent', then for any labelings l1 and l2,  
l1A ≼ l1B Û l2A ≼ l2B. 
For any permutation p: Ω ® Ω, there exist labelings l1, l2 such that p = l2 ∘ l1-1.   
So A ≼ B Û l1(l1-1A) ≼ l1(l1-1B)  
Û l2(l1-1A) ≼ l2(l1-1B)  
Û pA ≼ pB. 
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Conversely, if A ≼ B Û pA ≼ pB, and l1, l2 are labelings, let p = l2 ∘ l1-1.   
Then l1X ≼ l1Y Û p(l1X) ≼ p(l1Y)  
Û l2(l1-1(l1X) ≼ l2(l1-1(l1Y)  
Û l2X ≼ l2Y. n    
 
Proposition 5:  ‘≼’ is label-independent'.   
Proof:  Let p be a permutation of Ω.  Since permutations preserve cardinality, 
A ≼ B Û A \ B is finite and |A \ B| < |B \ A|  
Û p(A \ B) is finite and |p(A \ B)| < |p(B \ A)| 
Û pA \ pB is finite and |pA \ pB| < |pB \ pA| 
Û pA ≼ pB. 
By Lemma 1, it follows that ‘≼’ is label-independent'. n 
 
Proposition 6:  For any transitive, reflexive, and additive' relation ‘≼’ on sets (and the 
induced relation ‘~’), if A Ç B = C Ç D = Æ, A ~ C, and B ~ D, then A È B ~ C È D.  
Proof:  Assume that A Ç B = C Ç D = Æ, A ~ C, and B ~ D.  Let us partition A, B, C, and D 
into disjoint components.  Again we write XY for X È Y.  Let 
a = A \ (CD), 
b = B \ (CD), 
c = C \ (AB), 
d = D \ (AB), 
e = A Ç C, 
f = B Ç C, 
g = B Ç D, 
h = A Ç D. 
 
(See Figure 2.)  We want to show that abefgh ~ cdefgh.  By additivity', it is enough to show 
that ab ~ cd.  Since B ~ D, bfg ~ dgh.  By additivity', bf ~ dh and hence  
abf ~ adh. 
Since A ~ C, aeh ~ cef, additivity' implies that ah ~ cf and hence  
adh ~ cdf. 
By transitivity, abf ~ cdf, so by additivity' again, ab	~ cd.  Therefore, A È B ~ C È D. n  
 
Proposition 7:  ‘≼’ is additive'.  
Proof:  Assume A Ç C = B Ç C = Æ.  Then A \ B = (A È C) \ (B È C) and B \ A = (B È C) \ 

























A ≼ B Û (A È C) \ (B È C) is finite and |(A È C) \ (B È C) | < |(B È C) \ (A È C)| 
Û A È C ≼ B È C. n 
 
Proposition 8:  ‘≼’ satisfies containment'. 
Proof:  A Ì B Þ |A \ B| = 0 and |B \ A| > 0 
Þ A \ B is finite, |A \ B| < |B \ A|, and not |B \ A| < |A \ B| 
Þ A ≼ B and not B ≼ A. n 
 
Proposition 9:  ‘≼’ is regular'. 
Proof:  This is just a special case of containment', with A = Æ. n 
 
Proposition 10:  ‘≼’ satisfies complementarity. 
Proof:  This holds because A \ B = BC \ AC.  
Explicitly, A ≼ B Û A \ B is finite and |A \ B| < |B \ A| 
Û BC \ AC is finite and |BC \ AC| < |AC \ BC| 
Û BC ≼ AC. n 
 
Proposition 11:  Suppose that a relation ‘≼’ on the subsets of a countably infinite Ω satisfies 
complementarity and infinity dominance.  Then it is not monotonically continuous.  
Proof:  Let l be a labeling of Ω.  For i Î N, let Ai = {l(0), l(1), l(2),…, l(i)}.  Let B = {l(2), 
l(4), l(6),…}.  For each i, Ai ≼ B by infinity dominance.  But ⋃i Ai = Ω, so (⋃i Ai)C = Æ, and 
B is co-infinite.  So by infinity dominance, (⋃i Ai)C ≺ BC, and hence it is not the case that  
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BC ≼	(⋃i Ai)C.  By complementarity, it is not the case that ⋃i Ai ≼ B, so monotone continuity 
fails. n	
 
Lemma 2:  Suppose ‘≼’ satisfies label independence' and comparability and p: Ω ® Ω is a 
permutation such that pA = B and pB = A.  Then (i) A ~ B and (ii) AC ~ BC. 
Proof:  By comparability, A ≼ B or B ≼ A.  Without loss of generality, assume A ≼ B.  By 
Lemma 1, B = pA ≼ pB = A.  This proves (i).   
Complementarity would then imply (ii), but we need not assume complementarity 
here.  Instead, observe that, since pA = B, p(AC) = BC.  Similarly, pBC = AC, so by (i), AC = 
BC. n  
 
Proposition 12:  If Ω is infinite and a relation ‘≼’ on the subsets of Ω satisfies transitivity, 
label independence', additivity', and comparability, then A ≼ B for all A, B Ì Ω. 
Proof:  We first show that all co-infinite sets are equivalent, and then that all infinite sets are 
equivalent.  Since all sets are either infinite or co-infinite, and some are both, it follows by 
transitivity that all sets are equivalent. 
Case 1:  A, B are co-infinite but A È B is co-finite.  Then both A \ B and B \ A are infinite 
and co-infinite.  Hence there is an infinite, co-infinite C Ì A \ B and a permutation p such 
that pB = C and pC = B.  By Lemma 2, B ~ C and BC ~ CC. Similarly, there is an infinite, co-
infinite D Ì B \ A such that A ~ D and AC ~ DC.  But C and D are disjoint, infinite, co-
infinite sets, so there is a permutation q such that qC = D and qD = C.  By Lemma 2 again, C 
~ D and CC ~ DC.  By transitivity, A ~ B and AC ~ BC.  (The equivalence of the complements 
will come in handy later.) 
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Case 2:  A È B is co-infinite.  Choose an infinite C Ì (A È B)C such that C and  
(A È B È C)C are infinite.  Let D = (A È B È C)C.  Then A È C and D are disjoint, infinite, 
co-infinite sets, so there is a permutation p: Ω ® Ω such that p(A È C) = D and pD = A È C.  
By Lemma 2, A È C ~ D and (A È C)C ~ DC.  Likewise, B È C ~ D and (B È C)C ~ DC.  
Hence A È C ~ B È C and (A È C)C ~ (B È C)C.  (Again, the result about complements will 
be used later.)  By additivity', A ~ B.   
This shows that all co-infinite sets are equivalent under ‘≼’.  Now we turn to infinite sets. 
Case 3:  A, B are infinite but A Ç B is finite.  Then AC, BC are co-infinite and AC È BC =  
(A Ç B)C is co-finite.  Hence AC and BC satisfy the conditions of Case 1, so AC ~ BC and  
A ~ B.  
Case 4:  A Ç B is infinite.  Then AC È BC is co-infinite, satisfying the conditions of Case 2.  
As we did there, choose an infinite C Ì A Ç B such that (A Ç B) \ C is infinite.  As before, 
we get (AC È C)C ~ (BC È C)C, i.e., A \ C ~ B \ C.  By additivity, A = (A \ C) È C ~ (B \ C) 
È C = B. 
Hence, all infinite sets are equivalent and all co-infinite sets are equivalent, so by transitivity, 
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